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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the vast literature on auctions, surprisingly few papers have focussed explicitly on costly
information acquisition. This is somewhat puzzling given the close connections between
auctions and price formation processes in competitive markets. Milgrom (1981) uses a multi-
unit Vickrey auction model to illustrate the possible coexistence of costly information and
eﬃcient information aggregation. The connections to the rational expectations equilibrium
have been since worked on extensively but the issue of information acquisition has received
a lot less attention. In our view, the questions relating to socially optimal information
acquisition remain open for a large class of auction models.
If the auction designer has a utilitarian welfare objective and valuations are independent,
it is easy to see that the agents have the correct incentives to acquire information in a socially
optimal manner. In the Vickrey auction, individual payoﬀs, when viewed as functions of own
type only, coincide with the sum of payoﬀs to all players (up to the addition of a constant).
As a result, private incentives coincide with those of the planner.
If valuations are interdependent, however, private incentives diﬀer from those of the
planner. Maskin (1992) and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002), among others, have shown that
given the decisions by other bidders, individual bidders have too strong incentives to acquire
information if their valuations are positively dependent. Since these papers consider only
individual deviations, it is impossible to compare centralized and decentralized information
acquisition decisions. In this paper, we analyze equilibrium information acquisition in a
model with binary information decisions where the bidders’ true payoﬀ types are initially
unknown and each bidder may observe a costly private signal revealing her true payoﬀ type.
In a linear model with positive dependence, we show that:
(i) the private value of information exceeds the social value of information everywhere,
(ii) the private value of being informed is decreasing in the number of informed bidders.
Property (i) conﬁrms the results in Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002), and property (ii)
means that bidders’ information decisions are strategic substitutes. Property (ii) insures that
the local comparison can be extended to the equilibrium comparison. That is, with positive
dependence, more bidders become informed in the equilibria of the information acquisition
game than in the social planner’s solution.
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Our basic model is a single-unit auction where bidders acquire (covertly) information
about their true valuations simultaneously prior to the auction stage. Their valuations are
assumed to be linear in the signals of both their own and their opponents. A generalized
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is used to allocate the object. We consider pure
strategy equilibrium as well as mixed strategy equilibrium of this game of information acqui-
sition. For both types of equilibria, information decisions of bidders are strategic substitutes
and the equilibria feature socially excessive information acquisition. Moreover, the diﬀerence
between equilibrium level of information and eﬃcient level of information diminishes as the
strength of positive dependence weakens or as the number of informed bidders increases.
Since information acquisition is a binary decision, the pure strategy equilibrium may
be asymmetric: in equilibrium some bidders acquire information while others do not. In
this case, we show that more bidders become informed in equilibrium than in a planner’s
solution. For the mixed strategy equilibrium, we focus on the symmetric one. The relevant
comparison in the information acquisition game is the problem where the planner chooses
the same probability of becoming informed for all bidders. By this choice we can concentrate
solely on the informational externalities in the problem rather than the coordination problems
arising due to mixing. Again, our results show that the equilibrium probability of information
acquisition exceeds the socially optimal probability. In Appendix B, we show that the basic
insights of the single-unit auction carry over to a model where multiple objects are sold but
bidders have unit demands.
Furthermore, we extend our positive results to a nonlinear model which nests the speci-
ﬁcation with constant absolute risk aversion as a special case. We conﬁrm both property (i)
and (ii). However, it is diﬃcult to obtain similar results in a general nonlinear setting. The
main reason is the following. In nonlinear models, the ranking of two agents’ valuations,
depends in general on the signal realization of a third agent. Thus, the third agent’s deci-
sion to acquire information produces socially valuable information for the allocation decision
between the ﬁrst two agents. This is possible even in situations where the third agent does
not receive the object and the private value of her information is zero. Consequently, this
may lead to the reversal of ranking between private value of information and social value of
information. That is, property (i) may be violated.
In the paper, we also present an example to show why property (ii) is important for our
positive results. In the example, bidders’ valuations are positively dependent and individual
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incentives to gather information are higher than social incentives. But information decisions
are strategic complements, and thus violate property (ii). We show that the equilibrium
level of information may be insuﬃcient comparing to the social optimal one.
For most of the paper, we focus on the case where payoﬀs conditional on the allocation
depend only on the bidders’ true payoﬀ types. This speciﬁcation corresponds to the case
where the types represent speciﬁc pieces of independent information about the true value
of the object for sale. We also contrast this with a model where the valuations depend on
the signals observed by the bidders. This latter model can be seen as a reduced form of a
game where the initial auction stage is followed by an investment decision that depends on
the reports in the auction stage. For example, the value of a license to operate in several
markets will depend on the proﬁtability of each market, which is private information of the
ﬁrms operating in that market.
For the latter speciﬁcation, information acquisition decisions remain strategic substitutes
but individual incentives to acquire information is socially insuﬃcient. Therefore, property
(i) is violated. There are two reasons for considering this alternative model. First of all, it
shows that in a model with information acquisition, the results depend delicately on whether
payoﬀs are deﬁned in terms of payoﬀ types (even those that remain unknown to all bidders
at the auction stage) or signals. Second, this alternative speciﬁcation serves as a caveat
when thinking about our results’ implications for real world auction design.
1.2 Related Literature
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) propose a standard rational expectations model to address a
fundamental issue in economics: How does the market adjust to new information. In their
model, ex ante identical and uninformed market traders can acquire information with cost
and use it to make a proﬁt by trading a risky asset. The ﬂuctuation of prices makes private
information (partially) revealed to uninformed traders. They conjecture that if information is
costly, then equilibrium market prices cannot fully reveal private information. Furthermore
they argue that costless information is not only suﬃcient, but also necessary for eﬃcient
market. Another important conjecture is that information acquisition decisions are strategic
substitutes, the more individuals are informed, the less valuable is the information.
Traders in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) are assumed to be price-taking. This assumption
is criticized in Milgrom (1981) who argues that this assumption underlies the famous im-
Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions July 20, 2007 5
possibility result in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). On the other hand, Barlevy and Veronesi
(2000) show that information acquisition decisions might be strategic complements under a
diﬀerent model speciﬁcation. They show this by relaxing the standard exponential utility
and normal error distribution assumptions but maintaining the price-taking behavior of the
agents.
Milgrom (1981) suggests a resolution of the Grossman and Stiglitz paradox by explicitly
modelling price formation. A multi-unit Vickrey common value auction with ﬁnite number
of objects is proposed to illustrate the possible coexistence of costly information and eﬃcient
information aggregation. The equilibrium is shown to be an ex post Nash equilibrium. Thus,
the bidders’ behavior is very similar to the traders’ in the rational expectation equilibrium
model. The process of price formation, however, is explicitly modelled here and the price-
taking assumption is fully justiﬁed. He argues that there is no tension in this model between
the incentives to gather information and the informational eﬃciency of prices.
Milgrom (1981) results are extended and his assumptions are relaxed in Pesendorfer and
Swinkels (1997) (2000). Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) extends Milgrom’s common value
framework by allowing the number of objects to grow as well as the number of bidders.
They show that when both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not
receive an object becomes large, uniform price auctions are informationally eﬃcient. In
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000), a private component is introduced, so there is a tension
between allocation eﬃciency and information aggregation. When the number of bidders and
objects grow proportionally (the ratio of objects to bidders is bounded between 0 and 1),
they show that both allocation eﬃciency and information aggregation are achieved in the
limit.
Similar to Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000), Jackson (2003) studies a uniform price auc-
tion with both private and common component, but assumes that information about the
common component is costly to obtain. In the presence of information cost, he shows that
informational eﬃciency is not robust even to small information costs.1
1The result in Jackson (2003) seems to be contradictory to Milgrom (1981). The reason is that they use
diﬀerent notions of informational eﬃciency. Jackson (2003) requires that the price approximates the true
value of the good, while Milgrom (1981) requires that the price fully reveals private information acquired by
the market participants. In terms of Jackson’s criterion, the level information acquired in Milgrom’s model
may be insuﬃcient. This suggests that it is important to have an eﬃciency criterion within a model as in
this paper.
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All these papers focus on information aggregation in large markets given endowed or
acquired information. Other equally important questions are: does equilibrium information
acquisition coincide with the socially optimal level? What types of models generate excessive
information in equilibrium and what types of models lead to insuﬃcient investment in infor-
mation? These are the focus of the current paper. In the models mentioned above, either
the object has pure common value or the common component of the object is the same for
everyone, and hence the socially optimal level of information is always zero for allocation
purposes. Thus, these speciﬁcations are not suitable for our analysis. The speciﬁcations
contained in the current paper introduce a more general positive dependence into the model,
and thus allow us to compare equilibrium level of information to the social eﬃcient level of
information.
Another strand of literature has studied the incentives for information acquisition in spe-
ciﬁc auction formats. Stegeman (1996) shows that ﬁrst and second price IPV auctions result
in the same incentives for information acquisition. Matthews (1984) analyzes information
acquisition in aﬃliated private values auctions and compares the resulting revenues to the
auctioneer. Finally, Persico (2000) compares the revenues from ﬁrst and second price auctions
in a general aﬃliated model where the bidders invest in information prior to participating in
the auction. The main focus of these papers is on the revenue generating properties of the
various formats. As a result, they say little about the overall level of information acquisition
from the social welfare point of view.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 presents the
pure strategy analysis of the single unit auction with a linear payoﬀ structure. Section 4
derives the mixed strategy equilibrium in this environment. Section 5 extends the analysis
to nonlinear payoﬀ environments. Section 6 discusses the role of the strategic substitute
property and the role of the positive interdependence for the private excess returns from
information. Finally, Section 7 concludes. The proofs of all results are delegated to Appendix
A, and Appendix B contains the analysis of multi-unit auctions.
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2 Model
We consider an auction setting with a single object for sale and I bidders. The true value
of the object to bidder i is given by
ui (θi, θ−i) = θi + α
∑
j =i
θj, (1)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The parameter α is a measure of the positive interdependence. If α = 0,
then the model is one of private values and if α = 1, then the model is of pure common
values. Each agent i has a quasilinear utility:
ui (θ)− ti
where ti ∈ R is a monetary transfer.
Initially, each bidder i only knows that the payoﬀ relevant types {θj}Ij=1 are independently
drawn from a common distribution F with support
[
θ, θ
] ⊂ R+. The distribution F has an
associated density f and a mean valuation:
µ  E [θi] .
Each bidder i can acquire information about her payoﬀ relevant type θi at a positive cost
c > 0. The decision to acquire information is a binary decision. If bidder i acquires informa-
tion, then she observes the realization of θi; otherwise her information is given by the prior
distribution F .
We consider the possibility of informational eﬃciency in an eﬃcient allocation mechanism,
namely the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms (see Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000)). A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the implementability of the
eﬃcient allocation is that ui (θi, θ−i) satisﬁes the single crossing property. In the current
linear setting, the single crossing condition is equivalent to α ≤ 1.
We denote by yi the highest signal among bidders other than i, that is,
yi = max
j =i
θj.
The generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is deﬁned by an allocation rule
qi (θi, θ−i) =
 1 if θi > yi,0 if θi < yi, (2)
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which speciﬁes the probability of winning conditional on the reported type proﬁle θ. In case
of a tie among the highest types, the winner is chosen among the tied bidders with equal
probability. The associated payment rule
ti (θi, θ−i) =
 ui (yi, θ−i) if θi > yi,0 if θi < yi, (3)
speciﬁes the payment of bidder i. The winning bidder makes a payment which is equal to
her value of the object conditional on tying the payoﬀ type of the second highest bidder.
Consequently, the equilibrium payoﬀ for a bidder i at type proﬁle θi is
qi (θ)ui (θ)− ti (θ) =
 θi − yi if θi ≥ yi,0 if θi < yi.
In the generalized VCG mechanism, the payment of agent i is independent of the report
of agent i conditional on the allocation and the equilibrium is an ex post Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000)).
With the linear speciﬁcation of payoﬀ types given by (1), the expected value of an un-
informed bidder is the same as that of an informed bidder with a true payoﬀ type θi = µ.
The direct revelation mechanism therefore does not have to account for informed and unin-
formed bidders separately. In section 5 we shall look at environments in which the valuation
function is not linear in the types θi and then an uninformed agent will have to report her
entire distributional information rather than the mean µ only.
3 Pure Strategy Equilibrium
We ﬁrst establish the socially optimal information policy. Subsequently, we analyze the
equilibrium information policies of the agents in the generalized VCG mechanism. Initially
we focus our attention on the pure strategy equilibria and consider the mixed strategy
equilibrium in the next section.
3.1 Socially Eﬃcient Policy
The bidders are ex ante identical. The socially optimal policy has to weigh the beneﬁts of
increasing information against the cost of additional information. The social value of addi-
tional information arises from the possibility of identifying an agent with a higher valuation.
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As the number of informed agents increases, it becomes increasingly unlikely that an ad-
ditionally informed agent will have a valuation exceeding the highest valuation among the
currently informed agents. The optimal number of informed agents will therefore depend on
the prior distribution and the cost of information acquisition. We denote the set of informed
agents by {1, ...,m} and the remaining set of uninformed agents by {m+1, ..., I}. The agent
m is the marginally informed agent. We denote by θh the highest payoﬀ type among the
(m− 1) informed bidders, and denote the informed bidder with payoﬀ type θh as bidder h.
It is straightforward to characterize the expected social gain of the m-th informed agent.
The information of the m-th agent improves the social eﬃciency if and only if the information
is pivotal for the allocation decision. By the single crossing condition, the information of
agent m is pivotal if and only if it leads the planner to allocate the object to agent m. If
the payoﬀ type of agent m exceeds the types of all other agents, then it has to be larger
than the payoﬀ types of all informed agents {1, ...,m− 1} as well as all uninformed agents
{m + 1, ...., I}. Without loss of generality, we may assume that if the object is optimally
assigned to an uninformed agent, then it is assigned to agent I.
The expected social gain of informing agent m, denoted by ∆∗m, is then given by:
∆∗m = Eθ [(um (θ)− uh (θ)) · 1(θm ≥ θh ≥ µ) + (um (θ)− uI (θ)) · 1 (θm ≥ µ > θh)] , (4)
where the indicator function 1 (·) is deﬁned as
1(A) =
 1 if event A is true,0 if event A is false.
If bidder m becomes informed, then she may either win against bidder h or bidder I, re-
spectively. The size of the expected gain from the improved allocation is the corresponding
diﬀerence in the valuations between bidder m and the current winner. We can use the linear
structure of the valuation ui (θ) to rewrite (4) as:
Eθ [((θm − θh) + α (θh − θm)) · 1(θm ≥ θh ≥ µ) + ((θm − µ) + α (µ− θm)) · 1 (θm ≥ µ > θh)] .
With the linear payoﬀ structure, the expected gain from information depends only on θm and
the highest payoﬀ type among the remaining agents, θh or µ. We denote by ym the highest
payoﬀ type among all agents exclusive of m:
ym = max
j =m
θj = max {θh, µ} . (5)
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We can now write ∆∗m in a more compact form as:
∆∗m = (1− α)Eθm,ym [(θm − ym) · 1(θm ≥ ym)] . (6)
The case of m = I is slightly diﬀerent. If the last bidder I is becoming informed, then
indeed all bidders are informed. The information of bidder I now becomes pivotal in two
diﬀerent circumstances: (i) θh > µ and (ii) θh < µ. In the ﬁrst case, bidder I did not get
the object without additional information, but may now receive the object. In the second
case, bidder I did get the object without information, but may now fail to get the object if
her true payoﬀ type turns out to be below θh.
2 The expected social gain from information
is then given by:
∆∗I = Eθ [(uI (θ)− uh (θ)) · 1 (θI ≥ θh ≥ µ) + (uh (θ)− uI (θ)) · 1 (µ > θh > θI)] . (7)
By using the linear structure of the model, we can rewrite (7) to obtain:
∆∗I = (1− α)EθI ,θh [(θI − θh) · 1 (θI ≥ θh ≥ µ) + (θh − θI) · 1 (µ > θh > θI)] . (8)
We denote the socially optimal decision to acquire information for the m-th agent by
s∗m ∈ {0, 1}. Then we can state the social eﬃcient policy as follows.
Proposition 1 (Social Eﬃcient Policy)
1. The socially eﬃcient policy s∗m is given by:
s∗m =
 0 if ∆∗m < c,1 if ∆∗m ≥ c.
2. ∆∗m is strictly decreasing in m and α for all m.
The social gain from of an additional informed bidder is positive when the information
is pivotal with positive probability. When more bidders are informed, it is less likely that
the newly informed bidder has a payoﬀ type higher than those of her opponents. Therefore,
2The diﬀerence in the analysis of the marginal bidder m for m < I and m = I is only due to our initial
choice of selecting the last agent I to be the winning agent among all uninformed agents. Alternatively,
the social planner could have randomized the assignment among the uninformed agents (conditional on the
uninformed winning). In this case, the complicating eﬀect for agent I would have already appeared for all
agents before I.
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the gross social gain from information acquisition is decreasing in the number of informed
bidders.
With positive dependence, the eﬃciency loss from misallocation is lower than in an envi-
ronment with private values. A larger α, which represents a higher positive interdependence,
leads to a smaller loss from the misallocation due to the imperfect information. In conse-
quence the social gain from information acquisition is smaller when bidders’ valuations are
more positively dependent.
3.2 Equilibrium Policy
We now consider the private incentives of the agent to acquire information in the generalized
VCG mechanism. We maintain the notation and identify bidder m as the marginal bidder to
acquire information. We denote the expected private gain of agent m to become informed by
∆̂m. As in the socially optimal program, we assume that if an uninformed agent is assigned
the object, then it is assigned to the last agent I. If there are multiple uninformed agents,
then the resulting monetary transfer will leave agent I indiﬀerent between receiving and not
receiving the object. With this convention, it is again useful to treat the case of m < I
and m = I separately. The marginal bidder m gains from gathering information if and only
if she wins the object with the information. In the generalized VCG mechanism, the m-th
bidder’s net gain from information is:
∆̂m = Eθ [(um (θm, θ−m)− um (ym, θ−m)) · 1(θm ≥ ym)] ,
where we deﬁned ym earlier in (5) as the highest payoﬀ type among all bidders other than
m. We can use the linear payoﬀ structure (1) to rewrite ∆̂m:
∆̂m = Eθm,ym [(θm − ym) · 1(θm ≥ ym)] . (9)
We compare the private gain with the social gain of information as described by (6)
and (9), respectively. If bidder m’s information is not pivotal, then both the private and
the social value of information about the payoﬀ type θm is equal to zero. On the other
hand, when bidder m’s signal is pivotal, then the private gain from information about θm is
given (θm − ym) , but social gain from information is only (1− α) (θm − ym). The diﬀerence
between the private and the social gains stem from the requirement of incentive compatibility.
If agent m is to report truthfully, then she can only be asked to pay a monetary transfer
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equal to the lowest possible type at which the planner would be indiﬀerent between assigning
and not assigning the object to bidder m. In particular for all payoﬀ types above her pivotal
type, the monetary transfer has to stay constant, but her private beneﬁt increases at the
rate of 1. In contrast, in the social program, the marginal beneﬁt from an increase in the
payoﬀ type of agent m is given by (1− α) (θm − ym) as a higher payoﬀ type of agent m would
already be beneﬁcial at the rate α even if agent m is not assigned the object. Thus the social
beneﬁt of an increase in the payoﬀ type of agent m is moderated by the interdependence of
the valuations.
As we discussed in the context of the socially eﬃcient policy, the description of the
bidder’s gain from information is somewhat diﬀerent in the case of m = I. We have:
∆̂I = Eθ [(uI (θI , θ−I)− uI (θh, θ−I)) · 1 (θI ≥ θh ≥ µ)]
+ Eθ [(uI (θh, θ−I)− uI (θI , θ−I)) · 1 (µ > θh > θI)] ,
and using the linear payoﬀ structure we get:
∆̂I = EθI ,θh [(θI − θh) · 1 (θI ≥ θh ≥ µ) + (θh − θI) · 1 (µ > θh > θI)] . (10)
The ﬁrst term represents bidder I’s gain by winning the object from the informed bidder h
when her payoﬀ type is higher than the payoﬀ type of the remaining agents. The second
term represents bidder I’s gain by avoiding to pay more for the object than it is worth to
her given that her true payoﬀ type is lower than θh. By analogy, we refer to the equilibrium
decision of agent m to acquire information by ŝm ∈ {0, 1}.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Policy)
1. The equilibrium information policy is given by
ŝm =
 0 if ∆̂m < c,1 if ∆̂m ≥ c.
2. ∆̂m is strictly decreasing in m and constant in α for all m.
The private decisions of the agents to acquire information are again strategic substitutes:
bidder i is less willing to become informed as more of her opponents are informed. When
one more opponent gets informed, a bidder’s expected gain from information acquisition is
reduced in two ways. First, her chance of winning is lower. Second, conditional on winning,
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her expected gain from winning is lower. Thus, if there are more informed opponents, a
bidder’s incentives to acquire information are lower. This property ensures that the game
of information acquisition has an essentially unique pure strategy equilibrium for any given
level of information cost.
3.3 Welfare Comparison
We can now contrast the information decisions in the social and the equilibrium program by
comparing the marginal gains of information given by
{∆∗m}Im=1 and
{
∆̂m
}I
m=1
.
We use the strategic substitute property to guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Welfare Analysis)
For all m,
1. the marginal gains of information satisfy:
∆̂m ≥ ∆∗m;
2. the equilibrium information acquisition is (weakly) socially excessive;
3. the diﬀerence ∆̂m −∆∗m is increasing in α;
4. the diﬀerence ∆̂m −∆∗m is decreasing in m.
With positive dependence, the equilibrium gain for a bidder to acquire information is
higher than the social gain. This result, together with the strategic substitute property,
implies that given any level of information cost, more bidders get informed in equilibrium
than desired in the social optimum. The discrepancy between equilibrium and social policy
decreases as more bidders are informed and as the positive interdependence weakens.
The statement about the comparison between the private value and the social value of
information, ∆̂m ≥ ∆∗m, is weaker than what is actually established in the proof of the
proposition. The ﬁrst part of the above proposition says that on average the social value
of information is lower than the private value of information. In fact, the social value of
information is lower than the private value of information at every possible proﬁle of payoﬀ
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types. To see this, notice that when bidder m’s signal is not pivotal, both social value and
private value of information about θm is zero. On the other hand, when bidder m’s signal is
pivotal, the private gain from information about θm is (θm − ym) , but the social gain from
information is (1− α) (θm − ym) , which is smaller as long as α > 0.
The current results for the single unit auction generalize naturally to the case of multi-
unit auctions with the associated generalized VCG mechanism. The precise statements and
proofs for the multi-unit case are contained in Appendix B.
4 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
So far we restricted our attention to the analysis of pure strategy equilibria and we showed
that the pure strategy equilibrium is unique up to permutations of the ex ante identical
bidders. Similarly, a socially eﬃcient decision is always a deterministic policy. The pure
strategy equilibrium is frequently an asymmetric equilibrium in that some bidders acquire
and some bidders do not acquire information even though the bidders are ex ante identical.
It may be diﬃcult to see how this type of coordination might be achieved in a one-shot game.
As a result, it is of interest to also analyze the symmetric mixed strategy equilibria of the
game..
The mixed strategy equilibrium leads almost by deﬁnition to a socially ineﬃcient in-
formation policy since the agents frequently fail to coordinate their decision. In order to
facilitate a comparison with a socially optimal solution, we consider the problem of a plan-
ner who is restricted to choose an anonymous and hence symmetric information policy across
all agents. Under this restricted eﬃciency criterion we conclude, as in our earlier analysis,
that the equilibrium level of information acquisition will be higher than the socially eﬃcient
level.
In the current model, the cost of information acquisition is known and identical to all
the bidders. It is natural to extend the model to allow for diﬀerential costs of information
acquisition. If the cost of information acquisition were private information, then we can
think of the mixed strategy equilibrium here as the limit equilibrium of a model with pri-
vate information about the cost of information acquisition. By a standard argument ﬁrst
suggested by Harsanyi (1973), the mixed strategy equilibrium here can then be puriﬁed by
a model with private information about the cost of information.
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We restrict our analysis here to the case of moderate information cost so that the bidders
acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 1. The case of very low and
very high information costs would of course lead to degenerate mixed strategies and the only
complication would come from the qualiﬁcation to weak inequalities rather than equalities
in the equilibrium conditions. We denote by σ∗ ∈ (0, 1) the socially optimal probability of
acquiring information, and by σ̂ ∈ (0, 1) the equilibrium probability of acquiring information.
With slight abuse of notation, we deﬁne the expected gain from information function for a
representative agent by ∆∗ (σ), and we have:
∆∗ (σ) 
I∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−1 (1− σ)I−m ∆∗m.
We recall that ∆∗m is the expected social gain from an additional informed bidder when
(m− 1) bidders have already acquired information. The expected gain ∆∗ (σ) represents
the expected social gain from information when the planner is required to choose a single
probability σ of acquiring information for all bidders. Similarly, we deﬁne ∆̂ (σ) as
∆̂ (σ) 
I∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−1 (1− σ)I−m ∆̂m,
where ∆̂m is the individual gain for bidder m to acquire information when (m− 1) bidders
are already informed.
In the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, individual bidders must be indiﬀerent be-
tween acquiring information and staying uninformed. The expected relative gain from ac-
quiring information must be equal to the cost of information. Thus, the equilibrium policy
σ̂ must satisfy the following condition:
∆̂ (σ̂)− c = 0. (11)
Similarly, for the socially eﬃcient policy σ∗, the expected social gain from information must
be equal to the information cost:
∆∗ (σ∗)− c = 0. (12)
Proposition 4 (Strategic Substitutes)
The gains from information, ∆̂ (σ) and ∆∗ (σ), are strictly decreasing in σ.
The private and the social gain of a bidder from information acquisition are thus decreas-
ing as the probability of other buyers’ being informed increases. That is, the decisions to
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acquire information remain strategic substitutes when we allow for probabilistic policies. It
also ensures that there are unique probabilities σ∗ and σ̂ that satisfy equilibrium conditions
(11) and (12), respectively.
Proposition 5 (Excessive Information Acquisition)
For all σ∗ ∈ (0, 1): σ∗ < σ̂.
Thus the bidders have a higher probability of acquiring information in equilibrium than
in the social optimum. Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 extend the previous results in the
pure strategy analysis to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
5 Nonlinear Interdependence
We now investigate to what extent the results obtained in the linear payoﬀ model general-
izes to nonlinear environments.3 We introduce a new condition, referred to as no-crossing
property, which guarantees that the ranking of any two bidders is unaﬀected by the payoﬀ
type of a third bidder. We then show that the class of constant absolute risk averse utility
functions jointly with a linear aggregation model of the payoﬀ types satisﬁes the no-crossing
property.
We consider general nonlinear valuation functions given by:
ui :
[
θ, θ
]I → R.
We maintain a symmetric framework across agents. Speciﬁcally we require that for all i and
j and all payoﬀ type proﬁles θ and θ′, if θ′ is a permutation of θ and θi = θ
′
j, then
ui (θ) = uj (θ
′) .
We also maintain the single crossing condition in order to guarantee the truthful implemen-
tation of the eﬃcient allocation by means of the generalized VCG mechanism:
θi ≥ θj ⇔ ui (θ) ≥ uj (θ) . (13)
Finally, the positive interdependence in the nonlinear setting simply requires that
∂ui (θ)
∂θj
> 0, ∀i, j, ∀θ.
3We would like to thank our discussant, Tim van Zandt, who asked us to further develop the nonlinear
environment and who suggested the no crossing condition.
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Clearly, the earlier linear payoﬀ model belongs into the environment considered here. The
symmetry assumption is restrictive but natural. The single-crossing property is necessary to
implement the eﬃcient allocation. The positive dependence is necessary to guarantee that
the individual returns from information exceed the social returns from information. Within
this setting, we introduce the no crossing property. Without loss of generality, we label the
set of informed bidders by {1, ...,m}.
Assumption 1 (No Crossing Property)
The valuations {ui (θ)}Ii=1 satisfy the no-crossing property if for all m and all i, j = m :
∃θm s.t, E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] > E [uj (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] ⇒ ∀θm, E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] > E [uj (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] .
It is easy to verify that the earlier linear payoﬀ model satisﬁes the no-crossing property.
The no-crossing property requires that the ranking of the expected payoﬀ of two alternatives,
i versus j, is constant across all payoﬀ types θm of agent m. If all agents are informed about
their payoﬀ type and m = I, then the no-crossing property is automatically satisﬁed by the
single crossing condition (13) which simply states that the binary ranking of the alternatives
i and j is determined exclusively by their respective payoﬀ types θi and θj. The no-crossing
property condition extends the uniformity of the binary ranking to the comparison of two
bidders i and j, where i is informed about her payoﬀ type and j is not informed about her
payoﬀ type. If the no-crossing property is violated, then the information of agent m may be
socially valuable in determining the allocation between i and j without agent m ever getting
the object. But if agent m does not receive the object, then she will have very weak private
incentives to acquire information even though it would be socially valuable. In consequence,
the ranking between the social incentive and the private incentive to acquire information
may be reversed. The no-crossing condition has an important implication.
Lemma 1
If the no-crossing property is satisﬁed, then for all m and all i, j = m, if
E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1] > E [uj (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1] ,
then
E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] > E [uj (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] .
In words, the rank between bidder i and j after bidder m gets informed is the same as
the rank between them before bidder m becomes informed. The deﬁnition of the marginal
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gains from information, given by ∆̂m and ∆
∗
m, extends in the natural way to the nonlinear
environment. The next proposition shows that the private gain from acquiring information
will be higher than the social gain from information.
Proposition 6 (Excessive Incentives)
If the no-crossing property is satisﬁed, then ∆̂m > ∆
∗
m for all m.
The following graph illustrates the no-crossing property and the diﬀerence between pri-
vate value and social value of information. The no-crossing property requires that the two
curves
E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] and E [uj (θ) |θ1, ..., θm]
do not cross each other for all θm, as shown in the graph. In addition, the curve E [um (θ) |θ1, ..., θm]
crosses both E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] and E [uj (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] only once, which is implied by our
single-crossing assumption.
( )[ ]mmuE θθθ ,...,| 1
( )[ ]miuE θθθ ,...,| 1
( )[ ]mmmm zuE θθθ ,...,|, 1−
( )[ ]mjuE θθθ ,...,| 1
mz mθ
Figure 1: No-crossing property, private gain and social gain from information
Now we can use the graph to illustrate why the private gain from information is higher
than the social gain from information. Let’s consider the information decision of the marginal
bidder m. Suppose bidder i has the highest valuation among bidder m’s opponent and let
zm solve the following equation
E [um (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, zm] = E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, zm] .
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That is, zm is the cutoﬀ signal that bidder m will overtake bidder i as the winner of the object.
In the graph, zm is the value where the curves E [um (θ) |θ1, ..., θm] and E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm]
cross.
If θm < zm, then the social planner will assign the object to bidder i, and both private
value and social value of information about θm are zero. On the other hand, if θm ≥ zm, the
social planner will assign the object to bidder m, and the social gain from information is
E [um (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, θm]− E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, θm] . (14)
In order to induce bidder m to tell the truth, the payment of the generalized VCG mechanism
must be independent of θm conditional on allocation. In the graph, bidder m’s payment
conditional on winning is the dashed horizontal line:
E [um (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, zm] or E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, zm]
Therefore, the private gain from information about θm is
E [um (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, θm]− E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, zm] . (15)
Comparing expression (14) and (15), we can see that, for any realization of θm ≥ zm, the
private gain exceeds the social gain from information by
E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, θm]− E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, zm]
which is always positive because E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, θm] is increasing in θm. Integrating the
diﬀerence with respect to the density of θm, we can obtain the expected diﬀerence between
the private gain and the social gain from information, as indicated by the shaded area in the
graph.
Next we demonstrate that the private decisions of the bidders to acquire information
will remain strategic substitutes in the nonlinear environment, provided that the no-crossing
property is satisﬁed. In consequence, the pure strategy equilibrium in the nonlinear envi-
ronment will be unique and the equilibrium will necessarily display excessive information
acquisition compared the socially optimal solution.
Proposition 7 (Strategic Substitutes)
For all m < I: ∆̂m ≤ ∆̂m−1.
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The current result is stated and proved only for m < I. While we suspect that it will
naturally extend to the ﬁnal bidder, we have not been able to prove this result in the nonlinear
setting. A leading example of the no crossing property is the class of constant absolute risk
aversion utilities with a linear payoﬀ type structure. Consider the valuation function ui (θ)
given by:
ui (θi, θ−i) = 1− exp
[
−r
(
θi + α
∑
j =i
θj
)]
, (16)
with a coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion r > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1) . It is easy to verify that
the valuation model given by (16) is symmetric, satisﬁes the single crossing condition and
displays positive interdependence. The no-crossing property is satisﬁed as the payoﬀ types
are multiplicatively separable under the exponential utility function and the linear type
structure. It is further apparent that the no-crossing condition is valid for any multiplicative
separable speciﬁcation of the valuation function.
If the payoﬀ functions are neither additively nor multiplicatively separable, then the no-
crossing property may be violated. This is easily shown with the following example of three
bidders, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The valuation of bidder i is given by:
ui (θ) = (1 + θi)
2 + (θj + θk) θjθk. (17)
The payoﬀ types θi are assumed to be independently drawn from the uniform distribution
on the unit interval. Clearly, the model is symmetric, satisﬁes the single-crossing property
and displays positive interdependence. Within the example given by (17) it is now easy to
show that the ranking of an informed agent, say 1 and an uniformed agent, say 3, is aﬀected
by the payoﬀ type of agent 2. We omit the calculations.
6 Positive Interdependence
The analysis of the auction environment began with positive interdependence of the payoﬀ
types. We established that the private and the social decisions to acquire information are
strategic substitutes and that the private returns from information exceed the social returns
from information. Consequently, it might be plausible to deduce that the driving force
behind the results is the positive interdependence of the payoﬀ types. In this section, we
show that positive intrdependence is not suﬃcient to make information acquisition decisions
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strategic substitutes. In order to obtain the result on excessive information acquisition, a
separate argument for the strategic substitute property is needed.
6.1 Strategic Complements
With positive interdependence, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) show that the individual
bidders will have socially excessive incentives to acquire information given the information
decision of the remaining agents. The results in Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) are thus
about a local property of the decision of agent i in the sense that the decision of the remaining
agents are kept constant. In particular, the characterization of the individual decision may
not transfer to the equilibrium decisions of the agents. We now provide an example of positive
interdependence with the property that the decisions to acquire information are strategic
complements rather than strategic substitutes. Despite the positive interdependence, an
equilibrium of the game will display a lower level of information acquisition than the social
equilibrium.
Suppose there are two bidders, i ∈ {1, 2}, competing for single object. The payoﬀ
structure is the linear payoﬀ structure of the previous sections:
ui (θi, θj) = θi + αθj,
but we now allow for negative payoﬀ types. The social planner can either allocate the object
to bidder 1 or 2 or decided not to allocate the object at all. In particular it is eﬃcient not
to assign the object if the expected valuation of both bidders is below zero.
For concreteness, we consider α = 0.5 and assume that the payoﬀ types θi are indepen-
dently drawn from the uniform distribution with the support given by [−5, 1]. It is now easy
to verify that the decisions to acquire information are strategic complements. If bidder j
stays uninformed, then it is eﬃcient not to assign the object to bidder i for any realization
of her payoﬀ type. In consequence, the value of information for agent i is zero if agent j
does not acquire information. On the other hand, if agent j does acquire information, then
a positive realization by both agents may lead to the assignment of the object to agent i and
hence there is positive value of information.
Therefore, consistent with the analysis of Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002), the private
gain is weakly higher than the social gain from information. But the analysis of the indi-
vidual decision of agent i does not necessarily translate into a corresponding equilibrium
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characterization. For example, we can show by elementary computations that if the cost of
information is c = 1/100, then the eﬃcient policy requires that both bidders acquire infor-
mation. However, due to the strategic complementarity, there are now two pure strategy
equilibria for the game of information acquisition: one in which both bidders remain unin-
formed, the other one in which both bidders become informed. It is therefore possible that
the two bidders fail to coordinate on the eﬃcient equilibrium and stay uninformed.4 The key
for the failure of the equilibrium characterization is that the private gain from information
is increasing in the number of informed bidders, that is, information decisions are strategic
complements.
6.2 Privately versus Socially Pivotal Signals
The next class of allocation problems also represent a natural departure from the initial
model. There are I agents and the value of the assignment to a bidder is determined by her
own payoﬀ type as well as the K highest payoﬀ types among the remaining bidders, with
K < I − 1. In other words, the agents with the lowest payoﬀ types do not matter. More
precisely, the value of the assignment to bidder i is given by:
ui (θ) = θi + α
K∑
k=1
yik, (18)
where yik is the k-th highest signal among the remaining agents exclusive of i. We may
interpret the model as one in which an exclusive license is auctioned among I bidders. The
license gives the winner the right to operate in her own market and in the K most valuable
neighboring markets. The value of the license to operate in K markets depends consequently
on the K highest signals.
The diﬀerence between this license model and the earlier single unit auction model is
easily understood by distinguishing between privately pivotal and socially pivotal informa-
tion. In the license auction, an information is privately pivotal if it aﬀects the identity of the
winning bidder. Yet, an information can be socially pivotal if it changes the determination of
the neighboring markets in which the winner will operate. In the single unit auction model,
4We note that the negative payoﬀ types are not necessary to generate the strategic complementarity in
the information decision among the agents. A similar result could be generated in an asymmetric three
bidder model with positive types in which the information of agent i is relatively more important for agent
j than for agent k.
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a socially pivotal signal must be a privately pivotal signal as well. Yet, in the current license
model, a signal could be socially pivotal but not privately pivotal.
For simplicity we shall assume that the expected value of every market is given by µ = 0
and hence only informed agents can provide eﬃcient licensing agents (and markets). The
assignment rule of the associated VCG mechanism is given by:
qi (θi, θ−i) =
 1 if θi > yi1,0 if θi < yi1,
and it assigns the object to the bidder with the highest payoﬀ type. The associated payment
rule is given by:
ti (θi, θ−i) =
 yi1 + α
∑K
k=1 yik if θi > yi1,
0 if θi < yi1.
In the case of a tie, the license is randomly assigned among the competing bidders. With
this speciﬁcation, bidders’ valuations remain positively interdependent and the decisions to
acquire information will be shown to be strategic substitutes. Yet the equilibrium of the
information game may feature socially insuﬃcient information acquisition.
Now consider the bidders’ private incentive to acquire information. As before, let i =
1, ...,m denote the ﬁrst m bidders who acquire information and let i = m + 1, ..., I denote
the remaining bidders who stay uninformed. Since a bidder can gain only by becoming in-
formed and winning the object, the m-th bidder’s expected individual gain from information
acquisition is simply
Eθ [(um (θ)− tm (θ)) · 1 {θm ≥ ym1}] . (19)
The next proposition shows that the private gain of the m-th bidder from acquiring infor-
mation is decreasing inm. That is, when more bidders get informed, bidder i has a lower
incentive to acquire information and hence the information decisions remain strategic sub-
stitutes.
Proposition 8 (Strategic Substitute)
The private value of information ∆̂m is decreasing in m for K < m < I.
We now consider the information decision from the social perspective. The social gain
from the m-th bidder acquiring information is given by:
E
[
(θm − ym1) · 1 {θm ≥ ym1}+ α
K∑
k=1
(
θm − ym(k+1)
) · 1{ymk ≤ θm < ym(k−1)}
]
. (20)
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It is straightforward to see that the social gain from information is always higher than the
private gain from information as long as α is strictly positive.
Proposition 9 (Excessive Incentives)
If α > 0, then ∆̂m ≤ ∆∗m for all m < I.
Thus, the individual incentive to acquire information is socially insuﬃcient in the current
speciﬁcation. Together with the strategic substitute property established in proposition 8,
we can conclude that the equilibrium information acquisition is socially insuﬃcient for some
level of information cost c.
7 Conclusion
In a model with positively interdependent valuations, the equilibrium level of information
acquisition diﬀers from the socially eﬃcient level. This paper shows that in many speci-
ﬁcations of the model, information acquisition is excessive in equilibrium. This opens up
a number of new questions. How could a planner correct the incentives? If information
acquisition is covert, it is not easy for the planner to change the cost of information and the
uninformed bidders can always pretend to be the informed bidders. Participation fees reduce
the bidders’ expected payoﬀs, but at the same time they discourage uninformed bidders from
participating. This may result in suboptimal allocations. Another possibility could be that
the object is assigned at random between the highest bidders if the bids are relatively close.
The welfare losses from such a misallocation are small since this happens only when valua-
tions do not diﬀer much. On the other hand, the payments of all winning bids are increased
and hence the expected payoﬀs decrease as a result of such a policy.5
Our speciﬁcation features positive dependence among bidders’ valuations. If bidders
valuations are negatively dependent, one can show that in our basic speciﬁcation, informa-
tion acquisition decisions will remain strategic substitutes but the equilibrium information
acquisition will be insuﬃcient comparing to the social optimum.
Finally, in our model, the supply side of the model is ﬁxed. It would be interesting
to study information acquisition in large double auctions where the equilibrium price is
determined by competing buyers and sellers.
5If bidders cannot acquire information prior to participation, Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng (2003) construct
a sequential mechanism that extracts full surplus and induces eﬃcient level of information acquisition.
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8 Appendix A: Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs of all the results presented in the main body of the paper.
We ﬁrst state and establish a lemma that will be used in proving both Proposition 1 and 2.
Lemma 2
1. For all m,
Eθm,ym [(θm − ym) · 1(θm ≥ ym)]
is decreasing in m.
2. For all m,
Eθm,θh [(θh − θm) · 1 (µ > θh > θm)− (θm − µ) · 1 (θm ≥ µ > θh)] < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. We denote by Gm and gm the cumulative distribution and density of
θh, respectively. Since bidder h has the highest signal among (m− 1) informed bidders, we
have the usual order statistics with
Gm (θh) = F
m−1 (θh)
and
gm (θh) = (m− 1)Fm−2 (θh) f (θh) .
For part 1, we observe that
Eθm,ym [(θm − ym) · 1(θm ≥ ym)]
=
∫ θ
µ
∫ θm
µ
(θm − θh) gm (θh) f (θm) dθhdθm +
∫ θ
µ
∫ µ
θ
(θm − µ) gm (θh) f (θm) dθhdθm
=
∫ θ
µ
(
− (θm − µ)Fm−1 (µ) +
∫ θm
µ
Fm−1 (θh) dθh
)
f (θm) dθm +
∫ θ
µ
(θm − µ)Fm−1 (µ) f (θm) dθm
=
∫ θ
µ
[∫ θm
µ
Fm−1 (θh) dθh
]
f (θm) dθm.
The ﬁrst equality follows by the deﬁnition of ym, and the second equality is a result of integra-
tion by parts. It is easy to see from the last expression that Eθm,ym [(θm − ym) · 1(θm ≥ ym)]
is decreasing in m.
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For part 2, we note that
Eθm,θh [(θh − θm) · 1 (µ > θh > θm)− (θm − µ) · 1 (θm ≥ µ > θh)]
=
∫ µ
θ
∫ θh
θ
(θh − θm) f (θm) gm (θh) dθmdθh −
∫ µ
θ
∫ θ
µ
(θm − µ) f (θm) gm (θh) dθmdθh
=
∫ µ
θ
[∫ θh
θ
(θh − θm) f (θm) dθm −
∫ θ
µ
(θm − µ) f (θm) dθm
]
gm (θh) dθh
<
∫ µ
θ
[∫ µ
θ
(µ− θm) f (θm) dθm −
∫ θ
µ
(θm − µ) f (θm) dθm
]
gm (θh) dθh
= 0.
Thus, the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 1. From the social point of view, the m-th bidder should acquire
information if and only if the social expected gain ∆∗m is higher than information cost c.
That is,
s∗m =
 0 if ∆∗m < c1 if ∆∗m ≥ c .
The result ∆∗1 > ∆
∗
2 > .... > ∆
∗
I−1 follows from (6) and part 1 of Lemma 2. In order to prove
∆∗I−1 > ∆
∗
I , note that
∆∗I = (1− α)EθI ,θh [(θI − θh) · 1 (θI ≥ θh ≥ µ) + (θh − θI) · 1 (µ > θh > θI)]
= (1− α)EθI ,yI [(θI − yI) · 1(θI ≥ yI)]
+ (1− α)EθI ,θh [(θh − θI) · 1 (µ > θh > θI)− (θI − µ) · 1 (θI ≥ µ > θh)]
< (1− α)EθI ,yI [(θI − yI) · 1(θI ≥ yI)]
< (1− α)EθI−1,yI−1 [(θI−1 − yI−1) · 1(θI−1 ≥ yI−1)]
= ∆∗I−1.
The ﬁrst inequality follows from part 2 of Lemma 2 and the second inequality follows by part
1 of Lemma 2. The fact that ∆∗m is decreasing in α follows from expression (6) and (8).
Proof of Proposition 2. From bidder m’s point of view, the optimal information decision
is to acquire information if and only if ∆̂m ≥ c. That is,
ŝm =
 0 if ∆̂m < c1 if ∆̂m ≥ c .
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The fact that ∆̂1 > ∆̂2 > .... > ∆̂I−1 follows from part 1 of Lemma 2. Notice that
∆̂I = EθI ,θh [(θI − θh) · 1 (θI ≥ θh ≥ µ) + (θh − θI) · 1 (µ > θh > θI)]
= EθI ,yI [(θI − yI) · 1(θI ≥ yI)]
+EθI ,θh [(θh − θI) · 1 (µ > θh > θI)− (θI − µ) · 1 (θI ≥ µ > θh)]
< EθI ,yI [(θI − yI) · 1(θI ≥ yI)]
< EθI−1,yI−1 [(θI−1 − yI−1) · 1(θI−1 ≥ yI−1)]
= ∆̂I−1.
The ﬁrst inequality follows from part 2 of Lemma 2 and the second inequality follows by
part 1 of Lemma 2. From expression (9) and (10), it is easy to see ∆̂m is constant in α.
Proof of Proposition 3. Comparing expression (6)(8) with (9)(10), we have
∆∗m = (1− α) ∆̂m, for all m. (21)
Since 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, ∆∗m ≤ ∆̂m. This result, together with the fact that both sequences {∆∗m}
and
{
∆̂m
}
are monotonically decreasing, implies that in equilibrium, (weakly) more bidders
are informed in equilibrium than in a socially planner’s solution.
From (21), we obtain
∆̂m −∆∗m = α∆̂m.
By Proposition 2, ∆̂m is constant in α and decreasing in m. Therefore, ∆̂m−∆∗m is increasing
in α and decreasing in m.
Proof of Proposition 4. We can rewrite function ∆̂ (σ) as
∆̂ (σ) = (1− σ)I−1 ∆̂1 +
I∑
m=2
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−1 (1− σ)I−m ∆̂m,
In order to show ∆̂ (σ) is decreasing in σ, it is suﬃcient to show ∆̂ (σ) < 0.
∆̂ (σ) = − (I − 1) (1− σ)I−2 ∆̂1 +
I∑
m=2
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−2 (1− σ)I−m−1 [(m− 1)− (I − 1)σ] ∆̂m
=
I∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−2 (1− σ)I−m−1 [(m− 1)− (I − 1)σ] ∆̂m
Let m be the smallest integer m such that
(m− 1)− (I − 1)σ ≥ 0.
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Since ∆̂1 > ∆̂2 > .... > ∆̂I by Proposition 2, we have
∆̂ (σ) =
m−1∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−2 (1− σ)I−m−1 [(m− 1)− (I − 1)σ] ∆̂m
+
I∑
m=m
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−2 (1− σ)I−m−1 [(m− 1)− (I − 1)σ] ∆̂m
<
I∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−2 (1− σ)I−m−1 [(m− 1)− (I − 1)σ] ∆̂m
= ∆̂m
[
1
σ (1− σ)
I∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−1 (1− σ)I−m (m− 1)− I − 1
1− σ
I∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σm−1 (1− σ)I−m
]
= ∆̂m
(
I − 1
1− σ −
I − 1
1− σ
)
= 0.
The proof for social gain ∆∗ (σ) is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that ∆∗m ≤ ∆̂m for all m. Therefore, by (12),
c =
I∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
(σ∗)m−1 (1− σ∗)I−m ∆∗m <
I∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
(σ∗)m−1 (1− σ∗)I−m ∆̂m (22)
Comparing to the equilibrium condition about σ̂ :
c =
I∑
m=1
(
I − 1
m− 1
)
σ̂m−1 (1− σ̂)I−m ∆̂m,
we can deduce σ∗ < σ̂ by applying Proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. The assumption E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1] > E [uk (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1] implies
that there exists a θ̂m such that
E
[
ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, θ̂m
]
> E
[
uk (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, θ̂m
]
But by the no-crossing property, we must have
E [ui (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, θm] > E [uk (θ) |θ1, ..., θm−1, θm] for all θm.
That completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 6. To simplify notation, let J denote the set of informed bidders
{1, ..,m− 1} and θJ denote the vector {θj}j∈J . We need to show that, for any bidder
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m /∈ J, his private gain is lower than social gain from information about θm. Conditional on
the realization of θJ , there are two possible scenarios. First, conditional on θJ , the social
planner awards the item to i = m. Second, conditional on θJ , the social planner awards the
item to m and bidder i is the runner up. Let zm be the value at which
E [um (θ) |θJ , θm = zm] = E [ui (θ) |θJ , θm = zm] .
That is, zm is the cutoﬀ signal that bidder m will overtake bidder i if bidder m gets signal
higher than zm. By Lemma 1, we need to focus on bidder i and m only.
Case 1: Conditional on θJ , the social planner awards the item to i = m.If θm ≤ zm,
bidder i will retain the object, and both private value and social value of information about θm
is zero. If θm > zm, then bidder m wins the object and his VCG payment is E [um (θ) |θJ , zm]
or E [ui (θ) |θJ , zm] . Therefore, the private gain from information for bidder m is
E [um (θ) |θJ , θm]− E [ui (θ) |θJ , zm] ,
which is larger than the social gain from information
E [um (θ) |θJ , θm]− E [ui (θ) |θJ , θm] ,
because
E [ui (θ) |θJ , zm] < E [ui (θ) |θJ , θm]
by the assumption of positive dependence.
Case 2: Conditional on θJ , the social planner awards the item to m.
Let bidder i be the second highest bidder when bidder m is informed. If θm ≥ zm, bidder
m retains the object and both private value and social value of information are zero. If
θm < zm, bidder i wins the object. Bidder m’s gain from information by avoiding paying
more than the worth of the object. His private gain is given by
E [ui (θ) |θJ , zm]− E [um (θ) |θJ , θm] ,
which is higher than the social value of information
E [ui (θ) |θJ , θm]− E [um (θ) |θJ , θm]
because
E [ui (θ) |θJ , zm] > E [ui (θ) |θJ , θm]
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by the assumption of positive dependence.
Thus, in both cases, the private gain from information is higher than the social gain from
information. Therefore, ∆̂m < ∆
∗
m for all m.
Proof of Proposition 7. Again let J denote the set of informed bidders {1, ..,m− 1} and
θJ denote the vector {θj}j∈J . Fix J such that I−# {j|j ∈ J} ≥ 2, that is, there are at least
two uninformed bidders. We need to show that a bidder i’s private gain from information
when bidder m /∈ J is uninformed is lower than his private gain when bidder m becomes
informed. Conditional on θJ only, there are ﬁve possible cases.
Case 1: The social planner awards the object to k = {i,m} .
Case 2: The social planner awards the object to m, and the second highest bidder is i.
Case 3: The social planner awards the object to m, and the second highest bidder is
k = i.
Case 4: The social planner awards the object to i, and the second highest bidder is m.
Case 5: The social planner awards the object to i, and the second highest bidder is k =
m.
Given the result of Lemma 1, it is easy to see that for Case 1 and Case 3 bidder m’s
information decision has no eﬀect on bidder i’s expected gain from information. So we only
need to analyze the remaining three cases.
Let’s ﬁrst focus on Case 5. In this case, bidder i must be an informed bidder. Let θJ\i
denote the vector of signals of all bidders in J other than i, and let zi solve
E
[
ui (θ) |θJ\i, θi = zi
]
= E
[
uk (θ) |θJ\i, θi = zi
]
That is, zi is the cutoﬀ signal that bidder i has higher valuation than bidder k conditional
on θJ\i.Then bidder i’s expected gain from information is the diﬀerence
E
[
ui (θ) |θJ\i, θi
]− E [uk (θ) |θJ\i, zi] .
In order to compare bidder i’s private gains with and without bidder m’s information, it
is convenient to introduce a pseudo scenario as a benchmark. We will show that bidder i’s
expected payoﬀ without bidder m’s information is the same as his payoﬀ in the benchmark
scenario.
Benchmark: Suppose the social planner has access to bidder m’s private information,
but only treats it as an exogenous signal. In particular, bidder m cannot be the winner or
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the runner up based on his information. Then by Lemma 1, bidder i will still win the object
and the runner up is still bidder k. However, i’s payment will depend on the realization of
θm. Let ẑi solve
E
[
ui (θ) |θJ\i, θi = ẑi, θm
]
= E
[
uk (θ) |θJ\i, θi = ẑi, θm
]
.
Then bidder i’s expected gain is given by
E
[
ui (θ) |θJ\i, θi, θm
]− E [uk (θ) |θJ\i, ẑi, θm] .
We claim that ẑi = zi. To see this, suppose ẑi be the solution for some θ
′
m. That is,
E
[
ui (θ) |θJ\i, ẑi, θ′m
]
= E
[
uk (θ) |θJ\i, ẑi, θ′m
]
.
By no-crossing property assumption, we have for all θm,
E
[
ui (θ) |θJ\i, ẑi, θm
]
= E
[
uk (θ) |θJ\i, ẑi, θm
]
.
Therefore, ẑi = zi. Then it follows from iterated expectation that bidder i’s expected payoﬀ
with bidder m uninformed is the same as his expected payoﬀ in the benchmark scenario.
Once we establish the payoﬀ equivalence between the case with uninformed bidder m and
the benchmark, we can now compare the case with informed bidder m with the benchmark.
If
E [um (θ) |θJ , θm] > E [ui (θ) |θJ , θm] ,
then bidder m wins the object, so the private gain for bidder i goes to zero. Compared to
the benchmark, bidder i is worse oﬀ. If
E [ui (θ) |θJ , θm] > E [um (θ) |θJ , θm] > E [uk (θ) |θJ , θm] ,
bidder m becomes the second highest bidder, and bidder i payment will based on bidder m’s
valuations. So bidder i pays more and his payoﬀ decreases. Finally, if
E [um (θ) |θJ , θm] < E [uk (θ) |θJ , θm] ,
bidder i wins and the runner up is still bidder k, so bidder i’s payoﬀ remains the same. To
summarize, in Case 5, bidder i’s expected gain from information is lower when bidder m gets
informed.
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For Case 2, bidder m wins and the runner up is i. Since there are at least two uninformed
bidders (including m), there must be another uninformed bidder tied with m. So bidder i’s
payoﬀ will be zero regardless of bidder m’s information decision.
For Case 4, bidder i wins and the runner up is bidder m. Again since there are at least
two uninformed bidders, there must be another uninformed bidder j = m. We can redeﬁne
the runner up as bidder j, and then we return to Case 5.
Therefore, for all ﬁve cases, when bidder m gets informed, bidder i’s expected gain from
information either stays the same or decreases. The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 8. Note that bidder m acquires information if and only if his
expected gain is higher than the information cost. Thus, the private gain ∆̂m is equal to his
expected gain.
∆̂m = Eθm [(vm (θ)− tm (θ)) · 1 {θm ≥ ym1}]
= Eθm [(θm − ym1) · 1 {θm ≥ ym1}]
=
∫ θ
θ
[∫ θm
θ
(θm − ym1) dFm−1 (ym1)
]
f (θm) dθm
=
∫ θ
θ
[∫ θm
θ
Fm−1 (x) dx
]
f (θm) dθm
=
∫ θ
θ
Fm−1 (θm) (1− F (θm)) dθm
The fourth equality follows from integration by parts. It is easy to see that ∆̂m is decreasing
in m.
Proof of Proposition 9. By deﬁnition, the expected social gain ∆∗m from bidder m
becoming informed is
∆∗m = Eθm
[
(θm − ym1) · 1 {θm ≥ ym1}+
K∑
k=1
αk
(
θm − ym(k+1)
) · 1{ym(k+1) ≤ θm < ymk}
]
= ∆̂m + Eθm
[
K∑
k=1
αk
(
θm − ym(k+1)
) · 1{ym(k+1) ≤ θm < ymk}
]
≥ ∆̂m,
as long as αk > 0 for all k ≤ K.
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9 Appendix B: Multi-Unit Auctions
This Appendix contains the analysis of the multi-unit setting. Suppose there are k homo-
geneous objects and I bidders with I ≥ 2k. Each bidder demands at most one object.
The value of the object is deﬁned in (1). We will show that most insights obtained in the
single-unit setting can be carried through to the multi-unit setting.
As in the single-unit setting, if bidder i gets informed, he observes θi. Otherwise, he
assigns µ to signal θi. Let i = 1, 2, ...,m denote bidders who acquire information, and let i =
m+1, ..., I denote bidders who do not. Let θh to denote the k-th highest signal among (m− 1)
informed bidders, and let h denote the bidder with signal θh. That is, θh is the (m− k)-th
order statistic among (m− 1) random variables independently drawn from distribution F.
In addition, yi is the k-th highest signal among the opponents of bidder i. Finally, we need
one new notation. If m > I − k, we use θυ to denote (k − (I −m))-th highest signal among
(m− 1) informed bidders, and call the informed bidder with θυ as bidder υ.
Note that if θh < µ, then at least one object is assigned to uninformed bidders. On the
other hand, for m > I − k, if θν < µ, then every uninformed bidder is assigned one unit.
Similar to (2) and (3), the generalized VCG mechanism (qi (θi, θ−i) , ti (θi, θ−i)) is consists
of an allocation rule
qi (θi, θ−i) =
 1 if θi ≥ yi0 if θi < yi
that assigns the k objects to bidders with k highest signals, and a payment rule
ti (θi, θ−i) =
 ui (yi, θ−i) if θi ≥ yi0 if θi < yi
that speciﬁes the payment of the k winners.
It is useful to classify the multi-unit model into three possible cases.
(1) m ∈ [1, k]. Bidder m is assigned one object if θm ≥ µ, and the payoﬀ of bidder m is
um (θm, θ−m)− um (µ, θ−m) = θm − µ.
(2) m ∈ [k + 1, I − k] . Bidder m is assigned one object if θm ≥ max {θh, µ} . The payoﬀ
of bidder m is
um (θm, θ−m)− um (ym, θ−m) = θm − ym,
where ym = max {θh, µ} .
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(3) m ∈ [I − k + 1, I] . Bidder m is assigned one object if θm ≥ max {θh, µ} or µ > θm ≥
θν .The payoﬀ of bidder m is
um (θm, θ−m)− um (ym, θ−m) = θm − ym,
where
ym =

θh if θh ≥ µ
µ if θm ≥ µ > θh
θν if µ > θm ≥ θν
.
The ﬁrst two cases correspond to the case m < I in the single-unit setting, while the
last case corresponds to the border case m = I. Just as in the previous analysis, the last k
bidders’ incentives to acquire information is slightly diﬀerent from the ﬁrst (I − k) bidders.
The analysis of the last k bidders is more involved but it provides little additional insights. So
we will focus on the analysis of the ﬁrst (I − k) bidders. That is, throughout this Appendix,
we will assume m ≤ I − k.
As shown in the analysis of single-unit setting, the characterization of the social eﬃcient
and equilibrium policy is equivalent to the characterization of the sequences of ∆∗m and ∆̂m.
We start with the social eﬃcient policy. First suppose m ∈ [1, k] . In this case, an informed
bidder m improves the eﬃciency of allocation when θm ≥ µ. Without loss of generality, we
assume that if at least one objects are assigned to uninformed bidders then bidder I gets
one. The expected social gross gain from bidder m being informed is
∆∗m = Eθ [(um (θm, θ−m)− uI (µ, θ−I)) · 1(θm ≥ µ)]
= Eθ [(θm − µ) + α (µ− θm)) · 1(θm ≥ µ)]
= (1− α)Eθm [(θm − µ) · 1(θm ≥ µ)]
Next consider the case where m ∈ [k + 1, I − k] . Now an informed bidder m improves
allocation eﬃciency if θm ≥ max {θh, µ}. The expected social gross gain from bidder m being
informed is
∆∗m = Eθ
 (um (θm, θ−m)− uh (θh, θ−h)) · 1(θm ≥ θh ≥ µ)
+ (um (θm, θ−m)− uI (θI , θ−I)) · 1 (θm ≥ µ > θh)

= (1− α)Eθm,θh [(θm − θh) · 1(θm ≥ θh ≥ µ) + (θm − µ) · 1 (θm ≥ µ > θh)]
= (1− α)Eθm,ym [(θm − ym) · 1(θm ≥ ym)] ,
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where
ym = max {θh, µ} .
Therefore, for m ≤ I − k, the social gain ∆∗m is given by
∆∗m =
 (1− α)Eθm [(θm − µ) · 1(θm ≥ µ)] if m ∈ [1, k](1− α)Eθm,ym [(θm − ym) · 1(θm ≥ ym)] if m ∈ [k + 1, I − k] . (23)
Then the social eﬃcient policy is characterized by the following proposition. All proofs are
analogous to the proofs in the single-unit setting, and thus omitted.
Proposition 10 (Social Eﬃcient Policy)
For m ≤ I − k,
1. The social optimal policy is
s∗m =
 0 if ∆∗m < c1 if ∆∗m ≥ c ,
where ∆∗m is deﬁned in (23). Furthermore, ∆
∗
1 = ... = ∆
∗
k > ∆
∗
k+1 > ... > ∆
∗
I−k.
2. ∆∗m is decreasing in α.
Similarly, we can calculate that bidder m’s individual gain. For m ∈ [1, k], the expected
individual gain from information is
∆̂m = Eθ [(um (θm, θ−m)− um (µ, θ−m)) · 1(θm ≥ µ)]
= Eθm,ym [(θm − µ) · 1(θm ≥ µ)]
and for m ∈ [k, I − k] , the expected individual gain is
∆̂m = Eθ
 (um (θm, θ−m)− um (θh, θ−m)) · 1(θm ≥ θh ≥ µ)
+ (um (θm, θ−m)− um (θI , θ−m)) · 1 (θm ≥ µ > θh)

= Eθm,ym [(θm − ym) · 1(θm ≥ ym)] ,
where
ym = max {θh, µ} .
Therefore, for m ≤ I − k, the expected social value of information ∆̂m are deﬁned as
follows
∆̂m =
 αEθm,ym [(θm − µ) · 1 (θm ≥ µ)] if m ∈ [1, k]αEθm,ym [(θm − ym) · 1(θm ≥ ym)] if m ∈ [k, I − k] . (24)
Then we can characterize the equilibrium policy as follows.
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Proposition 11 (Equilibrium Policy)
For all m ≤ I − k,
1. The equilibrium information acquisition policy is
ŝm =
 0 if ∆̂m < c1 if ∆̂m ≥ c ,
where ∆̂m is deﬁned in (24). Furthermore, ∆̂1 = ... = ∆̂k > ∆̂k+1 > ... > ∆̂I−k.
2. ∆̂m is constant in α.
Finally, comparing (23) with (24), we can see that the following relation still holds for
m ≤ I − k:
∆∗m = (1− α) ∆̂m ≤ ∆̂m.
Therefore, we have the following results.
Proposition 12 (Welfare Comparison)
For m ≤ I − k,
1. The private gain from information ∆̂m is higher than the social gain from information
∆∗m.
2. The diﬀerence ∆̂m −∆∗m is increasing in α.
3. The diﬀerence ∆̂m −∆∗m is decreasing in m.
Therefore, Proposition 10, 11 and 12 essentially extend Proposition 1, 2 and 3 to the
multi-unit setting. Information decisions remain strategic substitutes, the equilibrium of
the game of information still features excessive information acquisition, and the diﬀerence
between individual incentive and social incentive to acquire information diminishes as more
bidders get informed.
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